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Preface 
A balanced approach to Chicago's development should build upon its 
manufacturing and commercial strengths. Popular analysts, however, have often 
argued that U.S. heavy manufacturing is dying, and that Midwestern cities should 
be cultivating service and high technology firms as a replacement. For 
instance, a recent blue-ribbon report on the Chicago economy urged the City to 
emphasize the developme~t of the software, international financial and 
health-care industries. 
This vision of .the Midwest's future has gained wide circulation, but is 
based on a questionable assumption: that services and high technology can 
prosper in the Midwest without a healthy manufacturing sector. A balanced 
economic development approach -- which encourages services, h1gh technology 
firms and manufacturers -- makes far more sense for Chicago and the region. 
Services are linked far more closely to manufacturing than first meets the eye. 
For example, during the recent recession, which so .afflicted Midwestern 
manufacturers, almost all of Chicago's services encountered economic hardship as 
well. In2many ways, services are a companion, not a substitute, for basic industry. 
A similar pattern exists for high tech. Chicago has traditionally had many 
high technology jobs, mostly in machine tools and electronics. But most of the 
growth in recent years has taken place in sunbelt states, fueled by .military 
contracts. It is unlikely that Chicago will attract many of these 
military-related projects: if the City is to have a high tech future, it will 
in man~ cases grow out of existing steel-related businesses, such as machine 
tools. 
During his mayoral campaign, Harold Washington addressed these concerns by 
prom1s1ng to pay immediate and strategic attention to Chicago's steel industry. 
As Mayor, he faced the challenge of how to best marshall the City's limited 
resources to preserve (and even4expand) manufacturing jobs, while continuing to 
nurture other economic sectors. To this end, Mayor Harold Washington 
established the Task Force on Steel and Southeast Chicago. 
The Task Force is a diverse and talented body, composed of experts from the -
steel industry, labor unions, academia, business, real estate and the community. 
Members have devoted more than a year to researching and analyzing the strengths 
and weaknesses of the steel industry and the southeast Chicago community, and 
are now formulating reconunendations for the Mayor. A portion of the steel and 
steel-related research conducted by the Task Force was designed and directed by 
Dr. Ann Markusen, Visiting Research Scholar, Center for Urban Affairs and Policy 
Research, Northwestern University. That research is reported in this document. 
Members of the Task Force, its working committees, and DEP staff also made 
important research contributions, and t~ese, along with Dr. Markusen's findings, 
will be incorporated into the final report of the Task Force. 
Dr. Markusen's research has had a significant impact on the Task Force 
process. The members' perception of the extent and importance of the local 
steel industry has been broadened, particularly in respect to the considerable 
advantages that Chicago offers to basic industry. Most importantly, this 
research has suggested many more ways to respond to the problems of steel and 
southeast Chicago than were initially under consideration, ranging from joint 
research ventures to programs for steel-using firms. But research alone does 
not produce clear, achievable recommendations. The Task Force was needed to put 
these proposals into context: a process which requires focusing, balancing, and 
assessing the feasibility, political acceptability, and time-frame of many ideas 
first suggested by the researc~. 
Research can be understood as playing a similar role throughout the public 
policy arena. Students of public administration have decried tge lack of 
adequate research in the policymaking process for many decades. The Washington 
administration has attempted to address these concerns: for example, through the 
establishment of a Research and Development Division within the Department of 
Economic Development. At the same time, research can only clarify possible 
policy options -- but cannot detennine the definitive course of action. The 
conflict between the limitations and importance of6research appears to lie deep 
within the nature of public -administration itself. 
I am pleased to introduce this report to the larger public. Its production 
results from a pioneering cooperation between the City and Northwestern 
University which we hope will continue. I believe it constitutes a significant 
contribution to the level of knowledge and awareness of the role of steel in our 
local -economy and lays the basis for -concerted action to revive our most 
industrially distressed communities. At the conclusion of this report, Dr. 
Markuson makes a nurriber of recommendations that are based on this specific 
research, her wide experience in studying steel in other regions, and her own 
policy preferences. I hope these recommendations are provocative and stimulate 
debate as they did for our Task Force on Steel and Southeast Chicago. 
Chicago, Illinois 
November, 1985 
Robert Mier, Commissioner 
Department of Economic Development 
City of Chicago 
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1The Commercial Club of Chicago, Make No Little Plans: Jobs for Metropolitan 
Chicago. Chicago: Commercial Club, 1984. 
2 Another example is the recent growth of business services. Much of this new 
economic activity has resulted from manufacturers cutting costs by spinning off 
functions once performed internally, e.g., factories are frequently laying off 
their maintainance staff and subcontracting to outside services. Without a 
healthy manufacturing sector, many of these business services will also suffer. 
3This view is also advanced in the only re.cent comprehensive analysis of the 
Midwest economy, the Ameritrust study by SRI International, Choosing a Future: 
Steps to Revitalize the MidAmerican Economy over the Next Decade. Menlo Park, 
CA: SRI International, Public Policy Center, 1984. 
4For a presentation of goals and policies, see "Chicago Works Together": 1984 
Chicago Development Plan·. Chicago: City of Chicago, 1984; for a review, see 
Norman Krumholz, Parick Costigan, and Dennis Keating, "The Chicago Development 
Plan 1984," Journal of the American Planning Association 51 (Summer 1985) 
395-96. 
5
see the discussions, for instance, in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Research and Policy Making: The Case of Regional Policy. Paris: 
OECD, 1982. 
6This conflict is also explored in Howard E. Mccurdy and Robert 
Can't We Resolve the Research Issue in Public Administration?" 
Administration Review 44 (January/February 1984) 49-55. 
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Executive Summary 
This research project, conducted in conjunction with the Mayor's 
Task Force on Steel and Southeast Chicago, probed two dimensions of a 
major economic development challenge. First, what are the causes of 
and prospects for combating unemployment and business distress on the 
City's Southeast Side? Second, since the community's recent decline 
is so heavily bound up with the steel industry, what forces are at 
work and what might be done to reverse the alarming rate of steel mill 
and related plant shutdowns in the area? Our findings suggest that 
although the current situation of both steel and the Southeast Side 
approaches crisis proportions, there are opportunities for industrial 
renewal. We hope the findings will serve as a foundation for the Task 
Force effort. 
Southeast Chicago: The City's Industrial Engine 
We found that Southeast Chicago performs a very special function 
for the larger Chicago economy. It operates as the power plant for 
the region's durable goods sector, a heavily interrelated complex 
which "exports" large quantities of metal products and machinery to 
the rest of the nation and world. Chicago's major steelmaking facili-
ties are locate.;l here, . as are many of their suppliers, distributors 
and finishing plants. Radiating outward, throughout the City and the 
midcontinent, are the metalworking, parts, machinery and transporta-
tion equipment plants whi~h consume large portions of this steel. 
Despite heavy setbacks, these steel-based durable goods sectors still 
account for about 12% of all jobs in the City of Chicago. This 
"export-base" supports other City services through a multiplier 
process, so that overall it accounts for 30% of the jobs in the City. 
Southeast Chicago remains a tightly knit milltown in its local 
economic relationships and cultural cohesiveness. But its function as 
a major engine fueling the City's economy means that it is highly 
dependent upon the larger national and international economies. 
Setbacks in steel and related industries since "the later 197os·have 
resulted in a recorded loss of more than 20,000 steel-based jobs in 
this area, led by large-scale closings at Wisconsin Steel and South 
Works. 
The shutdowns have created severe adjustment problems. A large 
sample of laid-off South Works employees report an average drop in 
family income of around 50%. Unemployment has tripled. As many as 
one in three local labor force participants is unemployed. Among 
local suppliers of the shuttered mills, conservative estimates are 
that one in two firms have failed and an additional 3,000 workers have 
been thrown out of work. Survey research suggests that lack of 
available alternatives is the single biggest reason for persistent 
joblessness. 
From the labor supply side, re-employment prospects in high tech 
and business services do not appear to be good. We found that the 
occupational structure of those industries does not match closely the 
profile of southeast Chicago workers. Other sectors, such as health 
care, do provide a better fit of jobs with local skills. However, the 
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growth of this type of activity is closely related to the viability of 
the economic base, making it a complement rather than a substitute for 
basic industry employment. Thus, no good alternative to an economic 
development focus on basic industry is available. 
Southeast Chicago remains a very attractive location for steel-
based activity. It possesses a skilled and stable labor force, 
first-rate infrastructure for the assembly of industrial materials and 
disposal of wastes, and adequate supplies of water and energy. It has 
a large inventory of available industrial land and buildingso It is 
served by one of the nation's most vigorous and diversified business 
service complexes _in nearby downtown Chicago. From a regional point 
of view, it is strategically located with respect to markets and 
offers ready access to Chicago's nexus of water, rail, highway and air 
transportation facilities. The Southeast Chicago economy is the 
subject of Chapter 1. 
How Other lndustrial Cities Are Coping 
Other midwestern cities face problems as severe as Chicago's 
southeast side. We surveyed recent efforts in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, 
Michigan, and Indiana to analyze and prescribe strategies for their 
ailing industrial base. The strategies often differ strikingly from 
each other in their diagnosis of the problem and their designs for 
redress. These alternatives are the subject of Chapter 2. 
One course can be characterized as "bowing out", relinquishing 
the manufacturing role and concentrating on recruitment and strength-
ening of services, high tech and small business. This strategy 
accepts the premise that manufacturing attrition is an inevitable 
product of long-term historical and competitive forces. The future 
lies, instead, in the "sunrise" industries. 
A second route can be dubbed "bidding down." This strategy 
espouses retention of basic manufacturing as the only viable route for 
revitalization of the midwestern economy. It is built on the view 
that the region's industrial ills are a function of uncompetitively 
high labor and public sector costs. The remedy is the elimination of 
differentials between Chicago and competitor regions' wage and tax 
rates, along with relaxation of regulatory rules which hamper business 
operation. 
A third approach, called "betting on the basics" rejects the 
hypothesis that cost differentials are the major source of the problem. 
Instead, it attributes current distress to a postwar industry structure 
which tolerated poor management and investment decisions. It also 
underscores the growing bias against heavy industry in recent macro-
economic policy choices. The distortions produced by these forces are 
reversible, in this view, with a Japanese style industrial policy, an 
infusion of capital, and a series of quid-pro-quos which guide invest-
ment decisions to ensure community and job stability. 
For Southeast Chicago, the choice of an appropriate strategy 
depends on two factors. One, can the area expect to maintain and 
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expand its role as the center of steel-related activity in the mid-
continental region? Two, is it reasonable to expect that steel and 
steel-using industries can reverse their dismal recent performance? 
These two quest,ions shaped the second portion of the research effort. 
Chicago's Steel-Based Industrial Complex 
Steel forms the glue in a basic industrial complex which spans 
the melting of ore in the blast furnace through to the production of 
bolts, metal shelves and buildings, boilers, engines, finished rail 
cars, tractors, and automobiles. Steel is the most important materia.l 
input into a large array of products which are sold mainly to other 
producers or to consumer as "durables" -- cars, stoves, refrigerators. 
The industries which make up this complex are Primary Metals, Fabri-
cated Metals, Non-electrical Machinery, Electrical Machinery, and 
Transportation Equipment. Each is a large supplier and/or customer of 
the others. Their significance for Chicago is the subject of Chapter 
3. 
The steel-based industrial complex has a distinct geographical 
identity. Many of itsplants have "agglomerated" around certain 
metropolitan centers where they can take advantage of the savings 
afforded by the proximity of their suppliers, customers and competi-
tors. Chicago is the most prominent of all these metropolitan steel-
based agglomerations. It is the nation's . number one job center for 
fabricated metals and both types of machinery, and second only to 
Pittsburgh in steel. It is also the largest steel distribution center 
in the nation. Unlike some of its sister cities, like Detroit and 
Pittsburgh, it is more evenly diversified across the industries within 
the complex. 
Links between these sectors and supplier industries form an 
auxiliary component of the Chicago area industrial complex. Interin-
dustry data reveals that area steel mills alone accounted for $135 
million in construction maintenance, $300 million in transportation 
services, $285 million in utilities, $275 million in wholesaling 
services, and almost $150 million in business and financial services 
in 1977, all purchased in the area economy. Chicago area households, 
of course, are a major supplier to these industries in the form of 
labor. Payments to households accounted for 35% of the expenditures 
of steel mills and 46% of those of metal fabricators. Thus, when any 
one plant closes, it leaves a lengthy series of local customers, 
suppliers and workers to readjust to its absence. 
But the Chicago area steel mil;ls also form the core of a series 
of larger regional complexes. The machinery and transportation 
equipment sectors in particular are dispersed throughout the Great 
Lakes and midcontinental areas. About 87% of raw steel produced 
locally is shipped within the east and west north central regions. 
Fabricated steel products are shipped even more broadly to manufacturers 
throughout the Tennessee Valley and Plains states. Indeed, since 
Chicago is within 500 miles of half of all U.S. manufacturing employ-
ment, and since domestic steel is generally shipped within a 500-mile 
radius, the midcontinental market for steel can be roughly drawn from 
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the Appalachians through the Rockies, bounded on the south by the Gulf 
and encompassing industrial Ontario to the north. 
Vis-a-vis this midcontinental complex, steel remains the key 
sector for Chicago. Of all the member sectors, it is the only one in 
which the Chicago area is increasing its national share. From 10% of 
national output in 1910, the Chicago area mills have steadily increased 
their share to around 30% currently. The Chicago area mills are 
relatively newer and more productive, specializing in higher valued 
added lines like sheet for which the demand is relatively more stable 
and imports less of-a .threat. As steel mills have been closed in New 
York, Pittsburgh, Ohio, and California, Chicago are mills have assumed 
a larger role in national output. This has occurred despite the 
erosion of its midcontinental market for certain product lines, like 
rod and wire, by minimills in decentralized sites. 
Our research shows that the linkages among the member sectors. are 
weakening in the Chicago-area economy. Steel-using sectors are 
decentralizing throughout the midcontinental region. International 
competition, magnified by a severe bias in exchange rates, has depressed 
both domestic and foreign demand for midwestern machinery, parts and 
appliances. As a result, some distressed companies have closed plants 
and moved overseas. Furthermore, a major shift in the federal budget 
away from spending on housing and infrastructure toward military 
hardware has depressed demand for steel generally and shifted the 
location of that demand toward the south west where it is more easily 
served by imports. 
However, these adverse regional shifts are countervailed by three 
important factors. · One, new methods of just-in"!'"time production favor 
continued spatial proximity of steel-using sectors with steel mills. 
Second, a shift toward trucking and away from rail and barge enables 
Chicago-area mills to reach manufacturers in more dispersed locations. 
Third, more complex processing and customer services in steel service 
centers help reinforce their attraction to the Chicago area. How well 
are Chicago-area steelrnakers adjusting to these changes in their 
market? 
Chicago's Integrated Steel Industry 
The bulk of Chicago area steel is produced in what are known as 
integrated mills, the subject of Chapter 4. Integrated mills are 
distinguished from minimills by their basic steelmaking operations 
combining ore, lime and coke to make iron from scratch, whereas 
minimills are essentially recyclers. Integrated steel mills are 
generally quite large, their size determined by considerable economies 
of scale. Chicago's integrated mills also possess rolling mills which 
specialize in products such as hot and cold rolled sheet, hot rolled 
bar and alloys. 
Much of Chicago steel's current problems arise from the demand 
side. We found through interviews and market analysis that the 
products in which Chicago mills specialize are heavily oriented toward 
the machinery and transportation equipment industries. These are 
iv 
r 
1 
' ~ I 
I 
r· 
I 
[ 
r 
I 
I . 
I 
L 
I : 
j 
u 
' ' f 
.._ _ 
! 
L: 
' ·~ 
. 1 
l 
--l 
' i 
J 
! 
- .. J 
_; 
I 
_J 
industries where the overvalued dollar has deeply depressed export 
sales, while favoring the importation of competitors' products from 
tractors and cars to components like axles. Almost all of the major 
steel-using industries in the industrial complex are in serious 
trouble domestically as well. Only autos and appliances improved 
their 1984 performance over a very poor 1983. Others, such as indus-
trial machinery and farm equipment, suffered from low levels of 
investment in the nation's fanns and factories. 
In facing a depressed market, Chicago steel must also cope with 
heightened competition from imports. Our analysis suggests that 
import penetration has been less severe here than in other re<J.ions. 
The overvalued dollar has been the major cause of the recent rise in 
imports into the midcontinental region, rather than cost or quality 
differentials • 
. In l ight of the market and import adversities , all Chicago-area 
steel firms have taken strong measures to reverse several years of 
extremely low profitability. As a group, they have chosen to cut 
. capacity drastically and to increase productivity through restructuring 
of the work process, resulting in significant job loss at every mill. 
However, the five integrated firms operating in the area exhibited 
surprising differences in market, product, investment, marketing, 
organizational and manpower strategies. Among the more successful 
were firms which either concentrated on bulk production of high 
value-added lines like sheet for a limited number of large customers, 
or on smaller batch, tailor-made runs for a large group of smaller 
customers. Less successful were strategies for diversifying into 
non-steel related businesses and mergers designed to trim and fit 
together two previous companies' facilities. 
We found that area steel firms have recorded significant gains in 
productivity in recent years, both from elimination of less efficient 
lines and improvements like continuous casting. However, their 
performance in the area of product innovation has been less impressive. 
Since product innovation has a relative superior impact on job creation 
than does process innovation, which often displaces workers, this 
appears to be an area for job creation opportunities. 
Chicago's Steel Minimills 
In the postwar period, a new type of steel plant called a minimill 
has continually gained market share at the expense of the integrated 
steel producers. Concentrating on simple and low value-added products, 
minimills recycle steel by melting scrap in relatively small batches 
and making steel in electric arc furnaces. The newer generation of 
minimills have been located in nontraditional places, like Nebraska 
and South Carolina, where they can dominate regional scrap markets and 
sell to the construction industry in the surrounding region. Minimills 
now claim about 20% of the domestic market, up from 3% in 1960 . 
Chicago's minimills are the subject of Chapter 5. In the Chicago 
area, there are three minimills -- one in Chicago Heights, one in 
Lemont (D.uPage County) and one in Sterling. In addition, there are 
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seven others within a 300-mile radius, three in Illinois and one in 
Indiana. u.s. Steel's South Works is now a minimill as well, since it 
melts scrap in electric furnaces to make its structural products. 
In interviews with three Chicago area minimills, we found that 
they are relatively older than most and relatively less profitable. 
Varying in size from 120,000 tons per year to 1.5 million in capacity, 
they serve a predominantly regional market, within 300 miles. In 
addition to the construction industry, the agricultural and construction 
machinery industries are their major clients. All are committed to 
remaining in business in the area, are investing solely in their 
. existing steel operations, and ar.e aggressively modernizing, despite 
the additional costs this incurs. 
Despite the minimills' impressive record nationally, the relative 
age and condition of Chicago area minimills places them at the low end 
of minimill performers. Two of the three were operating at relatively 
low levels of capacity utilization in early 1985, a bit above the 
integrated mills but substantially bel.ow the newer minimills. In the 
past decade, job loss at these mills has been 30%, 25% and 65% respec-
tively. Total employment at the three combined has fallen from about 
4700 to 3100. Much of the job loss is attributable to labor saving 
innovations, although in at least one case, layoffs resulted from a 
permanent move from three to two shifts. 
Chicago area minimills face a challenging future. A statistical 
analysis shows that there is room to increase market share in minimill 
product lines at the expense of imports in the Chicago area. The 
mills themselves have demonstrated a will to survive and compete; they 
are investing in continuous casters, entering new product lines, and 
searching for market niches. In large part, their success will depend 
upon the future of the heavy machinery industries regionally, since 
these are the markets targeted by the new product lines. The same 
macroeconomic factors which have hurt Chicago's integrated mills are 
also adversely affecting the area's minimills. : A revived construction 
industry and the resurgence, and retention regionally, of capital 
goods industries are essential to their longer term future. 
Investment in Future Steel Technologies 
The U.S. steel industry has changed its investment strategy 
considerably during the 1980s the subject of Chapter 6. All steel 
producers have become far more cautious about modernizing and building 
new equipment: and are concentrating on investments with the highest 
return. Integrated steelmakers differ greatly in their willingness to 
upgrade and construct facilities, while minimills are uniformly 
expanding product lines and boosting quality~ 
When specific steelmaking investments are examined, it is clear 
that spending has been extremely uneven. Very little, for instance, 
has been spent on upgrading coke ovens and basic oxygen furnaces, 
while massive sums are being poured into new continuous casters and 
electrogalvanizing lines. In general, investments are being pursued 
in the profitable finishing end of steelmaking, while many facilities 
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in the production or "hot" end are being neglected or shut. At the 
same time, many steel companies are focusing their production on the 
most remunerative product lines, especially steel sheet for auto-
mobiles and appliances. 
Future steel industry investments will depend on trade, techno-
logical and market considerations. But three likely outcomes can be 
anticipated: a centralized steel industry, with production primarily 
in the existing large Midwestern mills; disaggregated production, in 
which innovative changes will enable steelmakers to scatter widely; 
and uniformly declining steel production. 
The first scenario would clearly be best for the City, as several 
leading mills would be located in the Chicago region. Thus, research 
should be encouraged that will advance "centralization," such as new 
coke production methods and computer networks. Alternatively, radically 
new technologies could alter the geography of the u.s. "steel industry. 
Chicago must strive, therefore, to also become a center of steelmaking 
innovation. We have identified a variety of potential steel-making 
technologies which require research support. They range from tech-
nologies .which could make integrated mills more efficient to radical 
breakthroughs which favor smaller, streamlined mills. Only through 
such a two-pronged approach will a dynamic Chicago steel industry be 
assured. 
Steel Service Centers: A Chicago Specialty 
In the postwar period, a new phenomenon ~alled the steel service 
center has increasingly played a pivotal role in the steel industry, 
the subject of Chapter 7. Originating in steel warehousing activities, 
the service center performs the inventory storage and management 
functions for both suppliers and buyers, and processes steel through 
pickling, slitting, and sizing. Service centers eliminate the cost of 
possession for clients and economize on scrap loss and transhipment 
costs. As just-in-time delivery has become crucial for steel users, 
service centers' role has been enhanced, largely at the expense of 
sales operations in domestic mills. 
The growth of service centers has been impressive. They distribute 
more than 25% of domestically-produced steel currently, up from 17% in 
the late 1940s, and are expected to handle in excess of 40% within a 
decade. Jobs in metal wholesaling have increased over 200% in the 
same period, from 28,000 in 1947 to almost 90,000 by the 1980s. Jobs 
in steelmakers sales offices have declined modestly in comparison. 
Service center jobs are also associated with the handling of steel 
imports and steel substitutes such.as aluminum, copper, and plastics • 
The Chicago area is a major steel service center hub. More than 
3/4 of all steel supplied to industry moves through Chicago. The 
Chicago metropolitan area has more metal service establishments in the 
latest Census than any other -- 620 centers accounting for almost 
15,000 jobs. Even in the period from 1979 to 1982, when steel 
employment dropped precipitously in the area, steel service centers 
posted an impressive 7% growth in jobs. 
vii 
In the research reported here, two forces were found to favor 
further gains for the region. Long distance transportation rates are 
falling, expanding Chicago's market toward the outskirts of the 
midcontinental region, often at the expense of cities like St. Louis, 
Milwaukee, Indianapolis and Peoria. Second, the addition of more 
elaborate activities such as steel processing and sophisticated data 
processing to automate orders and distribution, has created "supermar-
kets" in major metropolitan areas, especially those like Chicago, 
which are major supply regions. 
Cook County accounts for over 80% of the employment in steel 
service centers within the region, but surrounding counties have 
recently added jobs at a faster rate. The smaller, less specialized 
wholesalers appear to be following their manufacturing customers out 
of the city, while the more specialized centralized functions serving 
a larger regional and national market remain in the city. The City of 
Chicago's ability to maintain and. increase steel service center jobs 
will depend upon the maintenance of basic steel production in the 
region, the superiority of transportation networks ·within the cify and 
larger region, and the condition of the major industries which buy 
from centers -- agricultural machinery, construction equipment, 
machine tools, auto parts, and the steel industry itself. 
Causes of Steel Job Loss 
A final portion of our research effort was devoted to dissecting 
the complex causes of steel job loss in southeast Chicago. This 
involved splicing together diverse bits of evidence on both the 
national steel industry and on Chicago's large but unique share of it. 
We concluded that three distinct forces have been at work, each 
accounting for about one-third of job loss in the first half of this 
decade. This is the subject of Chapter 8. 
First, new sources of competition have emerged which have success-
fully wrested market shares away from Chicago-area mills. Minimills 
in Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kentucky, Indiana and Michigan have 
successfully entered Chicago's markets for bar, rod and light struc-
turals. As much as 10% of area steel job loss can be ascribed to 
minimill competition. 
Another group of new competitors are the international companies, 
often nationalized, which sell steel in the U.S. These imports, which 
have risen dramatically in the last year, may account_ for as much as 
10% to 15% of area steel job loss. Another 5% may be the casualty of 
"indirect" imports -- the foreign steel embodied in machinery components 
and consumer goods imported from other countries. Internationally-tied 
job loss is also a function of a precipitous decline in steel exports 
from the U.S. and in "indirect" exports -- the steel that previously 
was contained in machinery exports to other countries. 
The second set of forces are those shaping the patterns of steel 
consumption. Two factors are at work here. One is the success of 
substitutes for steel -- plastics, aluminum, glass, and concrete. As 
much as 10% of area steel job loss can be associated with these 
viii 
I " 
I 
,-
1 
f 
f 
l 
l 
L: 
I 
L 
., 
: 1 
l 
' 
l 
.l 
... l 
! 
.i 
I 
___ j 
materials. However, most analysts believe that this transition has 
been completed. The emergence of new steel uses (e.g. metal buildings, 
new construction techniques) and development of better quality, 
lighter and less corrosive steels have helped steel meet this type of 
competition. 
A second factor in steel consumption decline is the extensive 
recomposition of the economy which has been taking place since about 
1967, closely associated with the integration of the international 
economy and accelerating with recent budget shifts. The U.S. is 
increasingly assuming the role of supplier of raw and processed 
materials, business services and military equipment to other nations. 
As a result, these sectors are growing rapidly, displacing non-military 
durable good exports and permitting the importation of larger portions 
of consumer goods. The expanding sectors require little steel in 
contrast to the traditional manufact1,lring sectors. As much as 25% of 
Chicago steel job loss can be attributedto these shifts. 
Production restructuring is the third major cause. In 1984, 
sales of steel at area mills resurged, but employment did not. Restruc-
turing has taken three forms: automation, intensification, and 
disintegration. Capital-embodied technological changes displace 
wbrkers by substituting machinery for manpower. Intensification 
occurs when fewer workers operate the same machinery to produce the 
same level of output, achieved by job combinations and increased use 
of overtime. Disintegration occurs when firms shut:. down specific 
portions of their operations and purchase the service elsewhere when 
they resort to subcontracting to eliminate regular jbbs. As much as 
40% of area steel job loss is associated with these phenomenon. 
In analyzing area job loss, we found that two important statistics 
often used to argue that the steel industry is "dying" are seriously 
biased. A decline in apparent consumption figures (domestic · steel 
shipments minus exports plus imports) suggests that Americans are 
consuming less steel. But increasing portions of steel are consumed 
into rising imports of cars, tractors, machine tools, appliances, 
radios, T.V. and imported components and escape measurement. Loss of 
export sales in machinery that embodies steel further depressed the 
consumption figure • 
Second, the figures on job loss in steel are overestimated by the 
failure to adjust for the fact that restructuring has resulted in many 
mill-oriented functions spun off to new firms, subcontractors, or 
emerging segments such as steel service centers. The jobs involved 
are no longer counted as steelworker jobs, but appear as trucking, 
wholesaling, construction and service sector jobs. Therefore, steel-
associated job loss is considerably less than that recorded, by as 
much as 50%. 
Are Chicago-area Wages and Energy Costs Too High? 
Chicago, as noted in Chapter 1, has an extraordinary ensemble of 
superior locational features for basic industry. However, two factors, 
energy and labor costs, are often mentioned as comparative disadvantages 
ix 
for the City. We investigated each of these problems, reported in 
Chapter 9. 
We found that energy cost differentials in steelmaking are 
largely a domestic issue. The U.S. steel industry faces similar or 
better utility costs than most of its foreign competitors, although 
its record in energy utilization is inferior to that of Japan. 
Chicago's energy costs do appear to be rising faster than those in 
other regions, largely because of the imminent increase in Con Edison's 
rates. This cost problem could be mitigated by a concerted effort to 
increase energy efficiency. 
Labor cost differentials, on the other hand, are largely a 
national not regional issue. Indeed, Chicago steelworker earnings are 
lower than those in competitor regions. American steelmaking wage 
rates are higher than those in other steelmaking nations, although a 
major portion of the differential is accounted for by bias in exchange 
rates. 
However, much of the discussion about labor costs confuses the 
problem of employment costs per ton of steel with what steelworkers 
actually make. Press articles often report that steelworkers .are 
making $26 per hour. Actually, steelworkers base pay is now around 
$1~ per hour, down from almost $12 in 1982. In addition, they receive 
small increments in incentive pay, overtime, and shift differentials. 
In 1985, steelworkers' average hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation, 
were below what they had been in 1977. This is not due to declining 
productivity~ indeed steel labor productivity has increased tremendously 
since 1979. It is the product of successful company bargaining for 
wage concessions. 
The $26 per hour frequently cited refers to the total employment 
cost for companies .. This figure is inflated because U.S. firms, who 
are free to lay off or retire workers du·ring downturns, add the costs 
of unemployment benefits, pensions, and insurance for these displaced 
workers into the hourly compensation figure. These figures sometimes 
include the white collar salaries and benefits, estimated to be 50% of 
total employment costs. 
Similar analyses of the auto industry suggest that there is no 
conclusive evidence on the contribution of wages to competitive 
disadvantage. Indeed, a major joint Japanese/American study has 
concluded that lacking proof of their significance, greater damage 
could be done by concessions-related rancor. I~~roved labor-management 
relations and greater worker participation have been suggested as a 
preferred strategy for responding to employment cost differentials. 
From a public sector point of view, this is a particularly attractive 
option since concessions erode family incomes and adversely affect 
other local businesses. In other words, a "bidding down" strategy may 
not be effective, but will surely lower the community's standard of 
living . 
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Future Directions for Steel and Southeast Chicago 
Our research results suggest that neither the "bowing out" nor 
the "bidding down" strategy will work for Chicago's Southeast Side. 
In an era when other city's leaderships are counseling the abandonment 
of steel and heavy industry, Chicago would be well-advised to pursue 
the counter strategy of espousing its steel-based industrial mission. 
Chicago is the midcontinent's Number 1 city, and the nation's third 
largest metropolitan area. Its vitality has always been based on the 
powerful complementarity of its heavy industrial base and its agricul-
tural hinterland, both the most productive in the world. 
If Chicago's leadership abdicates industrial advocacy, it may 
face a chain of adverse closing and relocation decisions which will 
hasten the disintegration of its industrial complex and further 
depress the entire economy. It can choose, instead, to marshal! its 
resources and savvy, intervening to retain selected ba~ic 
manufacturing facilities and pioneering needed innovations. It has a 
good chance to restore the City's industrial primacy and forge a 
mission for itself far into the future. We make three sets of 
recommendations in this final chapter, aimed respectively at basic 
steelmaking, steel-using industries, and Southeast Chicago. These 
directions represent options which have emerged in the research effort 
and represent the views of the authors as distinct from the Task Force 
itself. 
xi 
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CHAPTER 1: The Southeast Chicago Economy Today 
In the past decade, the southeast side of the City of Chicago has 
visibly deteriorated to a degree some would consider catastrophic. 
Many storefronts have been boarded up, some subsequently trashed. 
Weeds grow in front of rarely visited bars, and neighborhoods have 
become less stable and less safe. The chief causes of this decline is 
the shuttering of plants in steel and related industries. 
When an industry as large as steel restructures or closes 
capacity, the repercussions spread throughout the surrounding economy. 
While it is not too difficult to chart direct job loss resulting from 
plant closings, these numbers do not fully reflect the damage. 
Increased unemployment ripples through the community adversely 
affecting other producers, suppliers, area businesses, small shops and 
restaurants. Workers lose their security, their homes, their cars, 
their health insurance, and their self-respect. 
But it is not only the job and income loss which saps the local 
economy. The inter-industry linkages, which have historically 
provided strength within the industrial complex, are deteriorating. 
Suppliers to a closed steel mill find their market diminished. The 
mills' former customers must search farther afield, and perhaps pay a 
higher price, for their steel. The elimination of a local input or 
market may loosen these firms' commitment to producing in the Chicago 
area. This bodes ill for the local economy, as more job loss follows 
cutbacks and relocation in related industries. 
Since 1958, Cook and Lake (IN) Counties have suffered a net loss 
of 187,000 steel-related jobs. Most of this loss has occurred since 
1970, and most has been concentrated in blue-collar occupations. Even 
-1-
if the service sector were growing feverishly (and it's not), the jobs 
r-
created would not closely match the skills of the unemployed . No 
J 
economy can absorb this kind of occupational restructuring easily, and 
southeast Chicago is no exception. 
The southeast Chicago area has been particularly hard hit by the r-· 
decisions that have been made within the steel complex, since a I 
substantial number of the community residents were craftworkers, 
operatives, laborers or clerical workers for the steel companies . A 
large proportion of these d i splaced workers have had very little 
success in finding other employment which requires the skills and 
experience they acquired while working within the steel industry. 
Retraining programs have largely failed and many of these workers are 
now chronically unemployed. Unless manufacturing can be revitalized 
in the Chicago region a substantial number of Chicagoans will remain 
unemployed, and the once viable economy of the southeast area will 
experience permanent underemployment of its labor force, 
infrastructure and service sector. f ' 
' i In this chapter, we trace the recent decline of industrial work 
in the Chicago area, with a special focus on the southeast side. We 
review the corresponding rise in unemployment and outmigration of the 
population, and marshal! what evidence we can on the experience of the 
unemployed. We show the changing gender and occupational structure of 
the work force, and match these to the labor needs of various sectors ~ .. 
in the economy. We take a brief look at service sector industries, L 
concluding that they are complements of rather than substitutes for, 
basic industrial employment in the area. We conclude by showing that 
i. 
L 
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despite current ills, southeast Chicago remains a highly attractive 
site for heavy industry. 
1.1 The Boundaries of the Southeast Chicago and Regional Economies 
In the modern internationalized world, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to think of any national or regional economy as 
a single independent entity, let alone a set of neighborhoodsin a 
City. In the case of southeast Chicago, few of the necessities that 
people consume are actually produced within the area. On the other 
hand; an enormous amount of the labor expended in the community's 
workplaces goes into products, like steel, that are "exported" to 
other communities, states, and regions of the United States and 
abroad. 
Yet it i.s this very specialization in steel and heavy industry 
that gives southeast Chicago its workaday character. Furthermore, 
many of the local small businesses -- grocery stores, gas stations, 
hardware stores, bakeries, clinics, bars and so on -- are totally 
local-serving, their livelihoods dependent upon the spending of people 
wh~ live in the neighborhoods and work in the area. In this sense, 
southeast Chicago does form its own "economy" which is highly sensi-
tive to steel production and quite distinct from other portions of the 
Chicago area. 
In order to track both the uniqueness of this area's economy and 
its linkages with the larger region, we have retained the use of 
several geographical units of analysis in the discussion which 
follows. For reasons which have to do with data availability as 
1 
well, we use principally three different groupings: Southeast 
-3-
Chicago, the Chicago Area Industrial Economy, and the Midwest 
Manufacturing Economy. 
Southeast Chicago 
The geographic area commonly referred to as the Southeast Chicago 
area is bounded by the following: 
79th Street from Lake Michigan to Cottage Grove 
Avenue 
Cottage Grove Avenue South to the City Limits 
City Limits East and North to Lake Michigan 
The following neighborhoods are contained within these boundaries: 
Avalon Park 
South Chicago 
Burnside 
Calumet Heights 
Pullman 
South Deering 
East Side 
Hegewisch 
Riverdale 
Chatham 
2 This area is also divided into 33 census tracts. 
Chicago Area . Industrial Economy 
References made to the Chicago Area Industrial Economy will refer 
to: 
Cook County, Illinois 
Lake County, Indiana 
Porter County, Indiana 
These counties contain the bulk of steel-related industry in the 
region. 3 They also contain virtually all of the integrated steel 
mills west of Cleveland and Detroit, east of Utah and north of Texas. 
These mills make almost one-third of the nation's steel. They 
confront common probl ems in the midcontinent steel market and draw 
upon the same labor market. Many Chicago workers commute to Indiana 
mills and the competitiveness of mills located within the City of 
Chicago is often affected by conditions at the Indiana mills. We will 
also be referring to the City of Chicago, Cook County and the Chicago 
Standard Metropolitan Area (SMSA) when appropriate. 4 
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The Midwest Manufacturing Region 
Our use of the term Midwest Manufacturing Region, sometimes 
implying the midwestern economy, refers to the following states: 
Ohio 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Illinois 
Wisconsin 
This group corresponds to the Bureau of the Census' East North Central 
region. About three-fourths of all the steel produced in Indiana and 
Illinois is shipped within this region. At times, we will refer more 
broadly to the midcoritinental steel market; or midcontinental economy, 
which refers to the region stretching from the Appalachians to the 
Rockies from the Gulf of Mexico to the industrial portions of Ontario. 
1.2 The Troubled Industrial Base 
A disproportionate share of the businesses and jobs in southeast 
Chicago are steel related. This connection is a long standing one; 
indeed, much of southeast Chicago was one grand milltown in its 
origins. For much of the twentieth century, steel provided a vigorous 
base to the local economy, and only recently has this interdependence 
become a mixed blessing. With the massive extraordinary restructuring 
currently taking place in steel, the local economic base has suffered 
extraordinary levels of layoffs and persistent unemployment • 
Southeast Chicago as Milltown 
Like many other midwestern cities, Chicago in the mid-19th 
century had .its share of small iron foundries. They made hand tools 
for the craftworkers who built the city's factories and housing, and 
implements for the outlying farm economy. The first steel mills 
appeared on the north side of the Chicago River. But as the demand 
-5-
for steel skyrocketed with the coming of the railroads, the industry 
outgrew its narrow, urbanized confines and moved to the "suburbs", 
principally southward. When the Calumet Canal and Dock Company began 
promoting southeast Chicago to developers after the great Chicago 
fire, they successfully lured two mills -- Brown Iron and Steel 
(predecessor to Wisconsin Steel} in 1875 and the South. Chicago mill 
(predecessor of South Works) of the Chicago Rolling Mill Co. in 1880, 
to an area which was not then part of the City. 
The communities in the Lake Calumet area sprang up as industrial 
towns for the rapidly growing workforce, often recruited from 
immigrants. Pullman, of course, was an entirely planned community, 
but many of the other neighborhoods in the area were built as worker's 
housing, within walking distance of the mills. The "Bush," for 
instance, adjacent to South Works between 83rd and 86th Streets, first 
housed English, Irish and Welsh laborers who built the mill. 
Subsequently, the two-story densely packed houses filled up with 
5 Ea.stern European families and their boarders. South Deering' s Post 
Office was officially called "Brown's Mill" for almost a decade, as it 
was the paymaster at the mill who distributed the mail. That 
community was for a century informally called Irondale. Its streets 
were made of mill slag, and the revamped Wisconsin Steel mill supplied 
gas and electricity to portions of the town. 
Side by side with steel grew the railroad industry, making rail, 
rolling stock and locomotives, and the farm machinery industry (plows , 
harvesters, tractors). As a result, these communities grew to provide 
the tremendously skilled and varied workforce required by this unique 
industrial blend. Even as recently as 1966, a study documented the 
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close knit nature of this community. Residents tended to live, work, 
shop and use social services within the area. Their habits and 
culture distinctly "milltown" rather than urban (Greenhill, cited in 
Kijewski, Brosch, and Bulanda, 1972:46). 
While Southeast Chicago continues to be a very large producer in 
terms of output, job growth has evaporated since the late 1960s. This 
pattern is in large part an expression of enormous productivity gains 
in manufacturing in general, which have enabled continual increases in 
output to be produced with the same or even fewer workers. In 1956, 
the five basic sectors listed in Table 1.1 employed in excess 500,000 
workers. By 1982, only 327r000 jobs existed in the same sectors; 
Proportionately, job loss was heaviest in transportation equipment and 
nonelectrical machinery sectors, and least severe in fabricated 
metals. In Cook and Lake (IN) counties, 6 there were 50,000 fewer 
primary metals jobs, mainly steel, at the end of the period; in all 
five sectors, there were 187,000 fewer jobs. 
Recent Job Decline in the Southeast Chicago Industrial Base 
The job loss in Chicago's industrial base has accelerated in the 
past decade. In the Chicago area industrial economy, there were 20% 
fewer jobs in the five sectors in 1982 than just four years earlier. 
For the City of Chicago and the Southeast side, the job loss was even 
more dramatic (Table 1.2). Primary metal job loss was 45% on the 
Chicago side of the border from 1979 to 1983, 54% for the City and 65% 
for the southeast side. For every industrial category except 
electrical machinery, job loss rates on the southeast side exceeded 
those in the City, which in turn exceeded those in the SMSA. 
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Table 1.1. Steel-Based Industrial Jobs, Cook and Lake {IN) Counties, 1956-1982 . 
r-· 
SIC Industry Employment by Year {000) r-· 
1956 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 
r-
33 Primary Metals 131.1 . 120.1 121.6 123. 7 113. 1 109.4 80.2 f 
I 
34 Fabri cated Metals 100.1 97.3 97.6 100.7 102 .o 93.7 75.9 l 
35 Nonelectrical Machinery 116.4 82.7 93.5 93.0 83.5 73.8 64.B 
36 Electrical Machinery 121 ·.9 11_9 . 7 142.9 124.4 115. 1 99.0 83. 1 
37 Transportation Equipment 44.4 28.9 40.4 29.8 28.4 33.4 22.5 
TOTAL 513.9 448. 7 496.0 471.6 442.1 409.3 326.6 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns. 
Tabl e 1.2. Job Change in Five Basic Industrial Sectors, 1979-1983 
:-·~ 
. I 
', I 
Sector Chicago SMSA City of Chicago Southeast Side 
Primary Metals 
1983 Jobs 31164 14185 J ) 7074 
% Change 1979-83 -45% -54% -65% 
1 Fabricated Metals 1983 Jobs 76345 28070 1195 % Change 1979-83 -23% -29% -52% 
Nonelectrical Machinery 
1983 Jobs 70257 20760 2423 
% Change 1979-83 -38% -40% -57% 
El ectri ca 1 Machinery 
1983 Jobs 97105 25539 1296 
% Change 1979-83 -19% -34% +296% 
Transportation Equipment 
1983 Jobs 19065 7574 3650 
% Change 1979-83 -40% -40% -45% 
Source: Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, Where Workers Work. 
' 
_j 
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Altogether, southeast Chicago lost 19,556 jobs in these five sectors 
in just four years. 
Looking more closely at the steel sector itself, job losses for 
7 Cook County show short-term losses at around the same 50% level 
(Table 1.3). Plant closings were proportionately greatest in steel-
making (SIC 3312). And it is important to note that these figures 
predate the closing of South Works. Plant shutdowns in steel wire and 
related products were also severe, cutting employment by 72%. The 
more sophisticated products, such as sheet and tubing, often p r oduced 
in separate establishments, were relatively less hard hit. Only the 
latter category posted job gains. 
Steel job loss in the most recent period is a more complex 
phenomenon than it was previously, when productivity gains could be 
said to account for most net loss. As Chapter 8 discusses in detai l , 
productivity enhancing changes account for only about one-third of 
recent loss. New forms of competition -- minimills, imports and 
competitors for steel-using export industries -- account for another 
third. Finally, changes in consumption patterns, much of them the 
artificial product of recent federal government budget priorities and 
macroeconomic policies, account for another third of the loss. 
Despite these losses, steel and related industries remain a 
critical core of the Southeast Chicago, and indeed the area's, 
economy. In 1983, primary metals accounted for over 31,000 
metropolitan area jobs (not including the Indiana counties) and over 
14,000 jobs in the City of Chicago. They account for over 78% of 
durable manufacturing, 46% of all manufacturing employment in the 
City. Indeed, these five sectors account for 12% of all jobs in the 
-10-
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Table 1.3. Basic Steel Plants and Jobs in Cook County, 1978-82 
Establishments %change Employment %change 
SIC Sector 1982 1978-82 1982 1978-82 
3312 Blast Furnaces and Steel Mills 19 -29.6 14,240 -51 .6 
3315 Steel Wire and Related Products 16 -20.0 764 -71 .5 
3316 Cold Finishing of Steel Shapes 18 +63.6 1'119 -1 B.5 
3317 Steel Pipe and Tubes 14 +27.3 1,642 +6~8 
Basic Steel Total 67 -4.3 17 ,765 - 49.6 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, County Business Patterns, 1982, 1978. Compiled by John Metzger. 
-11 -
City of Chicago. With a multiplier of 2.0 to 2.5 (see Chapter 3), 
these sectors are responsible for up to 1 in 3 Chicago paychecks. The 
Chicago metropolitan area ranks "Number 1" in the country in 
fabricated metals, nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, and 
locomotive production, and "Number 2" (to Pittsburgh) in primary 
metals employmerit.8 
Southeast Chicago is the heart of this industrial complex. It 
hosts about half of the City's primary metals jobs and about 40% of 
its transportation equipment jobs~ While its customers in fabricated 
metals and machinery tend to be more spread out in surrounding 
communities, they remain heavily oriented toward the southeast side's 
steelmaking core. 
1.3 Consequences for Steel-Related Business 
When major plant shutdowns occur, many suppliers confront drastic 
cutbacks in their business. For this reason, studies which document 
job loss and multiplier effects from income loss severely understate 
the full economic repercussions of plant closings. This is 
particularly true in the case of southeast Chicago, where the mills 
are the major customers of other local employers. And not all of 
these impacts are local . Some spread out to suppliers in the City's 
surrounding communities, especially on the west side. 
The Case of Great Lakes Supply 
How this process works, and how a supplier tried to cope with it, 
is forcefully demonstrated by Great Lakes Supply, a firm which 
specializes in hand tool sales to industrial · companies. Great Lakes 
was until recently the third largest such supplier in northern 
Illinois and Indiana, its entire regional market. While it had 
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between 3000 and 4000 customers, its major customers were the large 
steel mills in southeast Chicago, especially U.S. Steel which consumed 
about 70% of its sales. Great Lakes had, in the late 1970s, 
aggressively modernized, introducing a Japanese-type just-in-time 
inventory system and offering customers a first rate "Volume 
Industrial Purchasing" program. 
Beginning in 1979, the firm's problems mounted with the recession 
and steel company rationalization (see Chapter 4). As the large 
integrci_ted steelmakers began to shut down lines and forego 
maintenance, their demand for tools diminished. In 1979, LTV 
cancelled an order which amounted to about $500,000 worth of inventory 
for Great Lakes, just under one-third of its entire inventory. 
Inventory carriage is a major expense for this type of supplier, since 
they must borrow to finance it. To make matters worse, interest rates 
had soared from 9% to about 22% in the same period. 
Subsequently, the Great Lakes big steel operation was approached 
by its large customers asking for discounts of 2% off the top. The 
final blow was the shutdowns at South Works. In 1981, Great Lakes had 
sold South Works $3.5 million worth of tools; in 1984, its sales to 
9 the same plant were a mere $10,000. By 1984, the drop in sales, 
interest rates and cash discounts wiped out Great Lakes' entire profit 
margin. In early 1985, Great Lakes Supply was forced to file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. 
In the view of Great Lakes President, John O'Connor, his 
company's problems are largely those of a small supplier facing a few 
large and powerful buyers. He notes that big steel companies will 
negotiate with ore companies and General Electric, offer discounts to 
-13-
Chrysler and GM, but will not give the little guy special treatment. 
On the contrary, they appear to take advantage of their monopsonistic 
position by squeezing the small supplier and playing one off against 
another. 10 This disadvantage is reinforced by the fact that the banks 
will not lend to small firms in trouble, like Great Lakes, when they 
consider the risk too high, but will lend to the larger steel 
companies, who can borrow at well below the prime rate by virtue of 
their sheer size. 
The Range ·and Extent of Supplier Closings and Job Loss 
Supplier closings range from other manufacturing firms which make 
materials and equipment for the mills to the strictly service sectors 
that provide soft drinks for vending machines, janitors for clean-up 
and printing for company circulars. It is difficult to fully trace 
the layoffs and shutdowns on the part of those suppliers, who are 
heavily dependent upon particular mills. The steelworkers' union 
identified several closings directly linked to South Works: Illinois 
Slag and Ballast (82 jobs), Chicago West Pullman Railroad (75 jobs), 
and ore boat operations (30). Partial shutdowns include Chemtron Gas 
and Baltimore Lumber. These are but examples of the way in which a 
closing ricochets through a supplier community. 
The best way of documenting supplier-related job loss would be to 
survey every vendor, identified from lists supplied by the major mills 
in the City. An effort to do this in progress at the Center for Urban 
Economic Development at the University of Illinois. CUED will submit 
questions to the South Chicago Economic Development Corporation, who 
will be visiting vendors as a part of a general industrial visiting 
program. 
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An alternative way of assessing supplier difficulties is to use 
an available data base, like Dun and Bradstreet, making some 
l 
assumptions about job loss in sectors that are typically mill 
l 1 . 11 supp iers. The CUED group has done this for both the City as a 
whole and for southeast Chicago (Zip Codes 60617, 60628, and 60633) . 
The results are shown in Table 1. 4 • 
. 1 
While not all of the job loss documented in each industry is a 
direct result of steel mill closings, the CUED team chose only those 
sectors in which they could identify one or more vendors directly from 
the lists supplied by the mills in question. Furthermore, the net 
figures understate the true level of displacement, since many more 
jobs actually disappeared .and were replaced by others in new firms. 
In many cases, the workers from the former group did not secure 
employment in the incoming establishments. 
overall, their selected sectors show a decline of over 3000 
southeast Chicago jobs in these manufacturing sectors between 1979 and 
1983. At least one sector, railroad equipment, may figure more 
prominently as a steel customer than a supplier, although to be 
included here, at least one firm was supplying a major local mill as 
well. Even if that sector's huge job loss is eliminated, these 
sectors suffered a decline of some 1300 jobs, or about 64%, in the 
southeast Chicago area. The number of firms successfully operating in 
southeast Chicago in these sectors was cut by almost 50% in the 
four-year period. Citywide, the losses were much greater numerically. 
It is important to stress that the CUED analysis was performed 
I 
. ../ only for the manufacturing sectors that supply the steel mills. There 
are many other types of suppliers who did not fall into these 
-15-
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Table 1.4. Firm and Job Decline in Southeast Chicago Steel-Related Manufacturing , 1977-83 
r-
I 
r 
Firms Jobs t I SIC Industry 1977 1983 1977 1983 Job Change 
229 Misc. Textile Goods 3 lfO 15 -63% 
r-: 
239 Misc. Fabricated Textiles 6 3 67 26 -61% 
264 Converted Paper Products 8 3 256 21 -92% 
289 Mi.sc. Chemicals 80 10 -88% f 
328 Cut Stone Products 0 2 0 -100% 
334 Nonferrous Metals 6 2 239 77 -68% 
335 Nonferrous Rolling, Drawing 3 114 5 -96% 
343 Plumbing and Heating 0 35 0 -100% 
344 Fabricated Structural Metal s 15 12 341 212 -38% 
354 Metalworking Machinery 5 6 107 201 +88% 
355 Special Industrial Machinery 4 3 69 67 -3% I 
356 General Industrial Machinery 4 3 520 37 -93% 
L 359 Misc. Non-electrical Machinery 11 4 122 31 -75% . -
374 Railroad Equipment 0 2000 0 -100% f 
1 
399 Misc. Manufacturing 8 3 39 23 -41% 
TOTAL 77 42 4031 725 -82% 
' 
________________________________________________ ) 
Source: Dun and Bradstreet Data, Compiled by Lynn McCormick and David Ranney, Center for Urban Economic 
Development, University of Illinois at Chicago. 
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categories. Distributors of raw materials or equipment, are not 
included -- they would fall into wholesaling categories. Great Lakes 
Supply, for instance, would not be encompassed in this effort. 
Transportation services comprise another large set of suppliers, 
especially as the mills have been relying increasingly upon outside 
trucking companies and independents for hauling their steel. Business 
services, such as advertising, office supplies, duplicating, 
accounting, legal, mail, maintenance and security services would not 
be included. Finally, employee services, such as canteen supplies, 
health services, and other on-the-premises functions are not included. 
If job loss in these ·supplier sectors was also includeq, the 
consequences of a shutdown would be multiplied substantially. 
1.4 Consequences for the Local Community 
Hardest hit by the layoffs and plant closings in steel are the 
southeast Chicago neighborhoods themselves, both their residents and 
the retail and service establishments that depend upon their 
paychecks. Unemployment has tripled over the past decade, and the 
actual number of residents employed fell, despite a national job 
growth rate of over 25%. As a result, population growth has been 
minimal, as natural increa·se was countered by outmigration. Whether 
measured in terms of unemployment, income, housing or health 
indicators, the situation in the community remains critical. 
Unemployment 
Officially, the unemployment rate for southeast Chicago rose from 
4% in 1970 to 11% in 1980 (Table 1.5). Strikingly, the total number 
of residents in the area who held jobs in 1980 was actually lower than 
in 1970, a drop from 63.5 thousand to 61.2 thousand working. Fewer 
-17-
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Table 1.5. Population, Employment and Unemployment, Southeast Chicago, 1970-1980 
Indicator 1970 1980 
I 
~~---------~~------------~---------~~------------------~------------------~-------------'-------------------------------~ l 
I 
Adult Population 108781 110418 
Men 51035 49512 
Women 57746 60906 
Labor Force 66166 68794 { 
Employed 63525 61246 
Unemployed 2641 7548 
Unemployment Rate 4.0% 11.0% 
Men 3.5% 11 • 4% 
Women 4,7% 10.5% 
Labor Force Participation Rate 61% 62% l 
Men 79% 77% .. 
Women 45% 51% I , 
--------------------------------L 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census , Census of Population, 1970, 1980. 
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southeast-siders worked in 1980 despite the fact that more of them 
were participating in the labor force. By the end of the 1970s, then, 
before the bulk of the steel mill closings, 5000 more residents of the 
area were unemployed than at the outset of the decade. 
Unofficially, unemployment in the area is much higher than these 
figures suggest, especially since the Wisconsin Steel (3200) and South 
Works (6000) closings. The South Chicago Development Cornmissionis 
survey in October 1982 found 22,450 people unemployed on the Southeast 
Side, estimating the rate of unemployment at 35% (Metzgar, 1985;9). 
The East Side Chamber of Commerce estimated that the neighborhood's 
official unemployment rate of 10% was woefully underestimated and that 
the actual rate was around 30% (Melaniphy and Associates, Inc., 
1983:24). 
When steelworkers no longer bring home a paycheck, their 
purchases from other local businesses fall precipitously. Total 
community job loss -- from steel mills, suppliers and local merchants 
-- is thus a multiple of initial steel layoffs. Several efforts to 
estimate this multiplier effect have been made. The Steelworkers 
Research Project in 1984 estimated that steelworker job loss had 
reached 11,000 following the South Works debacle. Using a multiplier 
of 2.1, estimated by Professor Joe Persky at University of Illinois, 
they placed total job loss at 23,000, A Center for Urban Economic 
Development study assessed steel job loss on the Southeast Side at 
15,000 from 1979 to 1983, with an additional 12,600 jobs lost 
elsewhere in the community, for a total of 27,600 (Metzgar, 1985). A 
somewhat larger multiplier of 2.5 was computed using regression 
-19-
analysis for the Northwest Indiana Economy by economist L. P. Singer 
(Singer, 1982:11). 
Averaging across these estimates, which vary modestly in the 
geographical coverage and data calculated, it appears that about one 
in three members of the area's labor force are without work. These 
extraordinary levels of unemployment within the community are a major 
contributor to the poor performance of the Chicago economy as a whole 
in official statistics. In both 1960 and 1970, Chicago area unemploy-
ment rates were less than the national rate= But by 1980, they were 
greater, especially in the City proper. Of the fourteen largest 
metropolitan areas in the U.S . , only Detroit (16%) posted a higher 
official unemployment rate in 1982 than Chicago (12%) • 
The major burden of new unemployment was borne by unionized 
blue-collar men. The United Steelworkers Union lost more than 40% of 
its members in the Chicago district (including the northwestern 
Indiana mills) from 1980 to 1984 (Table 1.6), a decline of 27,000. 
And these were by no means predominantly white male workers. Of 673 
laid-off workers surveyed in 1984 who had been working at South Works 
in 1981, 43% were black, 15% were hispanic, and 8% were women 
(Putterman, 1985). The "average" unemployed steelworker then, is 
black, male, and unionized. 
Unemployment rose dramatically for both women and men in South-
east Chicago in the past decade. But hidden unemployment is probably 
greater among men. Men's labor force participatio~ rates actually fell 
in the community during the 1970s (Table 1.5). This undoubtedly 
reflects the "discouraged worker" phenomenon, where men no longer 
looking actively for work are not counted in the labor force nor as 
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Table 1.6. United Steel Workers Membership, Chicago Area, 1980-84 
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unemployed . The bulk of the community's job loss in the 1970s had 
been in manufacturing -- down more than 4000 jobs and these jobs 
had beeh predominantly male. Older men have a more difficult time 
finding reemployment (Putterman, 1985:39). In 1980, for the first 
time in many decades, women's unemployment rates fell below those of 
men's . On the other hand, among steelworkers, women and minorities 
re-employment rates are far below those of white men. Among the 
laid-off South Works employees, 32% of whites were unemployed, 62% of 
blacks, 46% of hispanics i and 61% of women (Futterman, 1985;44) . 
This evidence is similar to the findings of a national Department of 
Labor study of 5.1 million workers displaced between 1979 and 1982. 
Only 3 .1 million had found work by January 1984. · Among these, blacks 
and Hispanics faired particularly poorly (Flaim and Sehgal, 1985). 
The primary cause of high levels of persistent unemployment is 
simply the lack of work alternatives. Of 44 unemployed South Works 
workers responding, the most often cited barrier tq working was "no 
available jobs," a cause which was twice as likely to be mentioned as 
any other (Table 1.7). A 1980 City-wide study of unemployed workers, 
heavily focused on minority and high unemployment neighborhoods, found 
surprising skill levels, education and a commitment to work. Most 
respondents had had full-time work experience and sought full-time 
work again. The typical respondent was young, likely to have finished 
high school if black or white (but not if Latino), was likely to be 
unmarried but if minority, supporting at least one child. Only about 
one-third were receiving unemployment insurance, less than one-fifth 
public assistance, and only one-fourth were being helped by their 
families . Most had at least one close friend unemployed and most 
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Table 1.7. Barriers to Securing New Employment, South Works Survey, 1984 • 
Reported Barriers Percentage Respondents 
No availabl e jobs 81 
Lack of education 20 
Lack of skills 35 
Wages offered tco low 30 
Age 25 
Race 13 
Sex 6 
Inadequate transportation 12 
Inadequate childcare 4 
Poor health 4 
Haven't 1 ooked 3 
Sou~ce: Putterman, 1985:20. Workers surveyed were given a list of barriers and asked to check all that 
applied to them with no ranking necessary. Responses from 447 workers still not working ful l -time 
in June of 1984. 
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reported knowing other people who were doing illegal things in order 
to get by (Alexis and DiTomaso, 1982). If work were available, these 
unemployed workers indicated they would eagerly apply. 
Supporting evidence for the view that there are not enough jobs 
for unemployed workers is borne out in empirical research by a 
Universlty of Illinois economist who found 
convincing evidence that employment location· 
factors play a role in the relative lack of 
economics opportunities for black workers in 
metropolitan Chicago .•• This means that the 
movement ·of employment opportunities out of the 
minority areas is particularly damaging to the job 
possibilities for minority workers. The reality 
of :the housing situation, in my view, is that the 
movement of rninori ty workers to the suburbs has 
not and cannot be rapid and extensive enough to 
overcome the problem ••. The best alternative would 
thus appear to be strategies to help businesse.s 
that are already located in minority areas to grow 
larger (McDonald, 1984:208). 
McDonald also documents the uneven pattern of industrial job decline 
across the metropolitan area. He shows that through the late 1970s, 
the Far South side experienced lower manufacturing job loss rates than 
any other area of the City, a situation which has been reversed since 
(McDonald, 1984:29-30). 
Population, Income, Housing and Health Effects 
The corollaries of unemployment are outmigration, income loss, 
and deterioration in housing and health. Southeast Chicago is 
historically and at present a very stable community. Of the South 
Works unemployed, 77% had lived here for five years or more 
(Futterman, 1985:22). Yet even in the 1970s, outmigration was 
stunting population growth. The 1980 Census showed that adult 
population increased only slightly, far below national rates (Table 
1.5). This differential is explained by net outmigration. Of 
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unemployed workers surveyed, 57% expressed a willingness to move if 
offered a job more than 100 miles away. Fewer, however, are willing 
to move without a job in sight (Futterman, 1985:34). 
The composition of households has been changing at the same time. 
In the 1970's, because of job loss and sustained unemployment for men, 
their recorded numbers actually declined -- there were 1500 fewer 
adult men counted in 1980 than in 197o. 13 At the same time, the 
number of adult women increased. As they did so, the share of 
female-headed households also rose . These trends have probably 
accelerated since 1980. 
Income loss has been enormous for households of laid-off 
steelworkers, including those who have found new work (32% of the 673 
respondents were working full-time in June of 1984). The hypothesis 
that other household members (mainly women) will go to work to 
counterbalance the loss of unionized male jobs did not hold for 
southeast Chicago in this crisis. The average household surveyed had 
fewer members earning income in 1984 than in 1979. This may be 
because many spouses already working or because more households became 
headed by a single parent or individual. Median household income fell 
from $20-25,000 in 1979 to $10-$15,000 in 1984, a drop of nearly 50% 
(Futterman, 1985:10-12, 42) . 
Job and income loss translates into crisis in meeting basic 
family needs. Nowhere is this more apparent or distressing than in 
the housing situation of families. The steelworker study found that 
168 families were forced to move because of reduced income (26%), 78 
were evicted (12%), 270 had fallen behind in monthly payments (47%), 
14 
and 25 had lost their homes to bank foreclosures (6%). Many 
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households had to do without a car. Before the layoffs, 92% owned at 
least one car; afterward, only 78% did. Cars were sold for cash, and f 
because maintenance and insurance costs could not be covered, in 31% r · 
of the families, and one or more cars were lost to repossession in 15% 
(Futterman, 1985:22). ,-
1 
Health problems have mounted in families of unemployed workers. 
More than a third of the workers experienced physical changes such as 
weight gain, increased smoking, headaches and lack of energy. Psycho-
logically, more than half related feelings of depression, anger, and 
anxiety, and reported increased TV viewing. Health problems are 
compounded by the dramatic cut in insurance coverage. More than four 
out of five families suffered insurance cuts, and three-quarters have 
deferred health care because of this. Perhaps most distressing of 
all, 44% of these workers have no health insurance at present 
(Futterman, 1985:23; Rosenblum, 1984). 
This evidence from the large survey of former South Works employ-
ees can only be suggestive of the range of suffering across the entire r 
L 
community. This group included just over 300 of the community's 
currently unemployed. If other members of the unemployed pool 
confronted problems even half as serious as this group has, the total 
I: 
L income loss and decline in living standards and health would be 
enormous. At least one effort15 has been made to quantify income loss 
($1.5 billion) and associated costs to governments from unemployment 
compensation, other forms of aid, and tax loss ($600 million) (Table 
1. 8) . 
I 
Southeast Chicago as a milltown in crisis is embedded in a larger L 
political unit. In Youngstown or Pittsburgh, a single mill shutdown 
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Table 1 .8. Estimated Costs of Steel Layoffs, Southeast Chicago, 1979-1983 
Tota 1 Ernp 1 oyment Loss 
Steel 
Other 
Total Production Loss 
Steel 
Other Products 
Total Income Loss 
Compensation to Steelworkers 
Other Income 
Total Costs to Government 
Unemployment C9111pensati on 
to Steelworkers 
Unemployment Compensation 
to other workers 
Food Stamps 
Tax Loss 
27 ,600 workers 
15 ,000 workers 
12 600 workers 
$1.9 bill ion 
$1 .2 billion 
$ .7 billion 
$1 .5 billion 
$ .9 billion 
$ .6 bill ion 
$607 mi.11 ion 
$105 million 
$ 25 million 
$ 33 million 
$444 mill ion 
Source: Metzgar, 1985: Table 21 . Figures from the Center for Urban Economic Development, University of 
Illinois at Chicago . 
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looms much larger in the local consciousness . Southeast Chicago has 
had a more difficult time capturing public attention and action around 
its steel situation. As the Steelworker Study puts it: 
One of the glaring problems facing dislocated 
workers was not only their lack of preparation for 
long-term unemployment; but the unpreparedness of 
the surrounding community, heal.th and social 
service providers, both public and private, the 
union and local government. Simply speaking, no 
one anticipated the urgency nor extent of the 
crises facing the workers and if they did, they 
kept it a secret. There was no advance planning 
for social interventions nor public policy changes 
which might have helped lessen the trauma of job 
loss (Putterman, 1985:49). 
It is precisely for these reasons that the Task Force on Steel and the 
Southeast Chicago was set up. 
1.5 Future Work Prospects: Matching Skills to Prospective Industries 
In order to absorb the high levels of unemployment, jobs must be 
created in sectors which demand existing labor skills. An 
occupational analysis shows that the southeast Chicago residents have 
a distinctive occupational structure, skewed toward blue and 
pink-collar (clerical) categories. Since the biggest steel-based 
losses have been in these skilled blue-collar occupations, and these 
same occupations have not grown proportionately in other segments of 
the economy, unemployed steelworkers have been forced to turn to 
other, mostly lower-skilled and lower-paying, types of work. An 
analysis of various alternative economic development prospects 
indicates that some fit the area ' s existing labor supply better than 
others. 
Southeast Chicago's Occupational Structure 
Southeast Chicago residents in 1980 displayed an occupational 
profile not terribly different from that of the City or the State of 
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Illinois (Table 1.9) . The major difference was that while the latter 
both had white-collar shares on the order of 36-37%, only 27% of 
southeast Chicago's residents held this type of occupation (managers, 
technical/professional workers and sales personnel). Southeast 
Chicago had a relatively high share of pink and blue-collar workers by 
contrast -- 73% compared to 63-64% for the larger units. Undbubtedly, 
if the occupations of the unemployed had been included in this Census 
count, the concentration of southeast Chicago residents in blue-collar 
skill categories would be even higher. 
The difficulties that Southeast Chicago labor pool has had in 
coping with structural change is illustrated by the extraordinary 
losses the community suffered in the craft and operative categories in 
the 1970s. Altogether, 5800 fewer residents worked in these 
occupational categories by 1980, compared to relatively modest 
declines Citywide. By contrast, southeast Chicago participated only 
weakly in the vigorous growth of the managerial, 
technical/professional and service occupations. In only two 
occupational categories did southeast Chicag~'s workers gain jobs 
faster than the City's: in transportation, up 1000 workers, and sales, 
up almost 2500. Despite these gains, the mismatch between new jobs 
created in the economy at large and the community's skills was serious 
enough to produce the tripling of unemployment documented above. 
What Jobs Have Steelworkers Moved Into? 
As jobs shift toward the white-collar occupations, steelworkers 
cannot easily make the transition. Of the 339 (out of more than 700) 
former South Works workers surveyed who had managed to find work for 
at least some period since being laid off, very few manag·ea to move 
-29-
Table 1 .9. Occupational Structure and Change in Southeast Chicago, Chicago SMSA and Illinois, 1970-1980 
Occupation 
Managerial 
Technical/ 
Professional 
Sales 
Clerical 
Servi ce 
Farming 
Craftsworker 
Operatives/ 
Laborers 
Transportation 
Share of all Employment, 1980 
Southeast 
Chicago 
6% 
12 
9 
23 
14 
0 
12 
19 
6 
Chicago SMSA 111 i noi s 
12% 11 % 
15 i S 
10 10 
21 19 
12 13 
0 2 
11 12 
15 16 
3 3 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1970, 1980. 
-3 0-
Percent Gain or Loss, 1970-80 
Southeast 
Chicago Chicago SMSA 111 inois 
+50% +69% +62% 
+1 +17 +19 
+75 +54 +58 
-3 +5 +7 
+10 +29 +30 
0 0 +2 
-28 -7 -1 
-20 -s -3 
+39 -9 -3 
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into these growth occupations (Table 1 . 10). Only 35% of these 
blue-collariworkers managed to find work in the crafts (23%) or as 
operatives Jl2%). The greatest number (53\) found themselves 
"de-skilled" into laborer, sales and service worker categories . If 
one takes into account the large number of workers who remained 
unemployed altogether, the probability that a former South Works 
production worker would find a comparable job is only about 20%. 
Which Sectors Create Jobs that Match Southeast Chicago's Occupational 
Profile? 
The skills and experience of Southeast Chicago residents inore 
closely match those needed by employers in :manufacturing and certain 
service sectors (especially health) than other types of activities 
(Table 1.11) • The manufacturing sectors offer heavy concentrations of 
jobs in the occupations tradi tional1y considered "male". Basic steel , 
for instance, and most of the other heavy industrial sectors, have 
more than 65% of their job offerings in the craft and production 
categories. The selected high tech manufacturing sectors shown --
measuring devices, medical instruments and opthalmic goods -- have 
larger professional/technical offerings than the local economy and 
relatively substantial needs for skilled blue-collar workers. 
Certain service industries, such as health, match the ~rea's 
existing workforce rather well, because they offer a mix of clerical 
and blue-collar jobs. In contrast, the striking fact about heavy 
industry is that it does not offer traditional "women's" work, largely 
clerical, at the levels matching these occupational concentrations in 
the population. Indeed, many Southeast Chicago industrial jobs are 
held by men commuting in from surrounding communities. In general, 
women have commuted farther to work from the community to reach their 
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Table 1.10. Occupations Currently Held by Former Steelworkers 
,-
j 
,- ' 
i Former Occupational Status 
Present Occupation Production Workers Apprentices Journeymen TOTAL l 
Professional/Technical 3% 6% 2% 3% 
r 
Managerial Administrators 2 4 2 2 
Sales Workers 8 11 3 6 , 
' I 
Clerical Workers 4 3 3 3 
Crafts Workers 8 22 41 23 f. 
Operatives 11 14 11 12 
Laborers 26 17 21 22 
Service Workers 35 17 15 25 l " 
Others 3 6 3 4 
l ' 
I 
~ 
Source: Putterman, 1985:16. 
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Table 1.11. Occupational Structure in Selected Industries and Southeast Chicago, 1980 
Occupation 
Sector Management Prof/Tech Clerical Sales Craft/Production 
Basic Steel 6% 6% 8% 2% 67% 
Stee1 Foundries 6 5 5 74 
Cutlery, Hardware 6 5 11 2 68 
Metal Stampings 5 3 7 75 
Misc. Fabricated Metals 6 6 12 2 67 
Farm Machinery 7 9 9 67 
Metalworking Machinery 8 7 11 3 64 
Motor Vehicles, Parts 6 9 10 2 65 
Opthalmic Goods 8 10 6 46 
Measuring Devices 6 19 16 48 
Medical Instruments 11 10 16 3 39 
SOUTHEAST CHICAGO 6 12 24 9 37 
Health Services 7 39 17 0 36 
Banking 17 2 58 3 
Securities, Commodity 14 18 53 0 2 
Real Estate, Insurance 25 0 35 3 2 
Computer, Data Services 9 27 37 5 0 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1980, and Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, 
Occupational Employment Statistics, 1980 • 
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workplaces. While the business service sectors, heavily downtown in 
orientation, offer high levels of clerical employment, they offer 
almost no blue-collar jobs that might fit the skills of the heavily 
minority and male unemployed. 
A number of qualifications must be added. First, although high 
tech manufacturing would appear to fit well the area's skill profile, 
a more disaggregated analysts of occupations would show serious 
deficiencies, which might be made up in part by retraining programs. 
However, the research presented in Chapter 3 suggests that outside of 
the machining industries, Southeast Chicago has little prospect of 
attracting high tech industries, which are well-rooted in suburban, 
sunbelt and military-oriented locations. 
Second, while the service sectors would create more clerical 
jobs, their fortunes are quite closely tied to the health of the basic 
manufacturing sector. Indeed, recent evidence on Chicago area service 
sector growth shows that from 1960 to 1982, the area's job growth in 
services, finance, wholesaling and retailing lagged the nation's by 
almost 50% (Commercial Club 1984b; Squires, et al, 1986). The 
Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (1985) estimates 
that from 1980 to 1985, Cook and DuPage counties suffered declines of 
4% in transportation and utilities, 5% in retail trade, 0.2% in 
wholesaling accompanying a decline of 14% in manufacturing. 
Indeed, the midwest economy as a whole has suffered much slower 
rates of growth in service industries than has the nation (Table 
1.12). Both Illinois and midwestern growth rates have been far below 
the U.S. in evey category. In most service sectors the Southeast 
Chicago job loss rate exceeded that of the rest of the metropolitan 
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Table 1,12, Growth Rates in Midwest and Illinois Population and Employment, 1979-1984, 
1 
I 
United States Midwest lli inois 
* Population +4 . 2% o.o +0.7 
J 
Employment, Nonagricultural +4,8 -4.5 -5.1 
I I 
I 
Employment in Manufacturing -8.2 - 17.3 -22.5 
Employment in Service +21.4 +13.5 +13.S 
Employment in Wholesale & Retail Trade +9.1 o.o +0.2 
Finance, Real Estate, Insurance +14.6 +6.7 +7.7 
J Source: Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition, 1985. 
* Population figures are for 1980-84. All others are for 1979-1984. 
I 
.J 
J 
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area (Table 1 . 13) . The exception is transportation, where job loss 
was less dramatic, suggesting perhaps some comparative advantage. 
These sector·s are thus complements, rather than substitutes for, 
manufacturing activity. As mills close down, these sectors suffer a 
substantial loss of business, and therefore jobs, as orders for their 
services evaporate. 
Finally, it should be stressed that job loss and unemployment is 
greatest in those categories generally considered "blue-collar." 
Clearly, the fastest way to mitigate these losses and replace them 
with new jobs is to target those manufacturing sectors in which 
Chicago has a special advantage. 
1.6 Southeast Chicago's Comparative Advantages 
While the excellence and stability of the labor force just 
discussed form the most prominent of southeast Chicago's comparative 
advantages, there are others that stand out as well. The area has an 
extraordinary infrastructure which facilitates the assemblage and 
disposal of industrial materials and wastes. Supplies of water, 
electricity, gas, and waste disposal facilities are abundant. 
Although energy costs are an increasing concern, especially as nuclear 
power plant construction and maintenance costs are blended into the 
rate base, alternative supply arrangements can be made. The area is 
crisscrossed with highways, canals, and rail lines that permit the 
easy movement of coal and iron ore into the mills, the transhipment of 
! 
steel from one plant to another for finishing and fabricating, and the 
shipping of steel products out to markets in a broad region. 
Second, the area has a large inventory of available industrial 
land, some of it in quite large parcels. In some cases, recyclable 
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Table 1.13. Selected Service Sector Job Change, Chicago Area, 1979-83 
I Chicago Metro City of Chicago j \ Sector. 1983 % Change 1983 'lo Change 
Transportation 87763 -13% 29836 -25% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 224344 + 4% 153457 + 3% 
Wholesaling, Durables 144825 - 6% 56400 -23% 
Contract Construction 78670 -24% 28842 -20% 
Reta i1 Trade 462623 - n 164019 - 7% 
Source: Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, Where Workers Work, 1979, 1983. 
I 
I ! -37-
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Far South 
1983 % Change 
2147 - 1% 
3246 - 1% 
2796 -23% 
2372 -31% 
12221 - 1% 
,. .... 
r 
I 
r: 
buildings stand on the land; in others, it is ready for new 
,-, 
construction. Because there are no significant competing uses for the l 
land, it is inexpensive. It is also extraordinarily close to the 
center of the Chicago SMSA, an advantage for just-in-time production 
needs which are growing in significance to manufacturers. It is 
r 
accessible to many different supplier and user sites in terms of both 
time and distance. 
Third, the southeast Chicago industrial area is superbly located 
f rom a regional point of view. It is poised at the transportation hub 
of the inidwestern and midcontinental economies. This centrality dates 
from the era of the railroads, but has been reinforced by the system 
of interstate freeways. Southeast Chicago facilities can serve 
diverse customers in a far-flung region. This continued prominence is 
ensured by the vigor of the wholesaling and warehousing sectors in the 
Chicago area . I 
Finally, Chicago industrial plants are served by one of the L 
nation's most vigorous and diversified business service sectors. The 
best in consulting services, advertising, financial services and data 
processing is available locally. Furthermore, Chicago's business 
• . i 
services firms specialize in the industrial and agricultural r . 
L activities that dominate the nation's internal economy. Information 
about these services and choice among competing firms are available 
more readily to local manufacturers than to those in more peripheral 
I 
locations. l~ 
! . 
u 
. 
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···1 CHAPTER 2: Divergent Routes for Southeast Chicago 
I In the past few years, a number of leading midwestern cities, 
states and private sector groups have fashioned economic development 
strategies for their regions. A stunning range of opinion on the 
necessity of retaining basic manufacturing has emerged from these blue 
ribbon efforts. Some courisel "bowing out" gracefully from heavy 
industry. They accept the inevitability of manufacturing decline and 
advocate policies for high tech and services. 
Others argue that heavy industries are the heart of the regional 
economy and must be attended to if the current exodus of population 
and jobs away from the region is to be stemmed. One subset of these 
stress high lclbor and other public sector costs as the roots of 
industrial ills. They favor "bidding down" the cost of doing business 
as the chief remedy. Another subset argues that industrial revival 
requires creativity, innovation and new investment. They prefer 
betting on selected facilities and subsectors as the winners in a 
restructured industrial base. 
To some extent, the differences in strategic posture arise from 
peculiarities of the subregional economies in question. But much more 
important are disagreements about (1) the causes. of urban industrial 
decline and (2) the range of options available. 
J Competing visions for Southeast Chicago can be characterized by 
these alternative views. In this Chapter, the best of recent regional 
I 
l 
. .J studies are reviewed. This Chapter concludes that Chicago would be 
better advised to "bet on the basics" for revitalizing the Southeast 
Chicago economy rather than to follow either than bowing out or 
bidding down. 
J - 39-
2 .1. Bowing Out 
One prevalent view, nationally as well as regionally, is that 
basic industry is suffering from product obsolescence, unbeatable 
foreign competition, aging facilities, and poor management. These 
1 
"Sunset" industries, in the phrase of Lester Thurow, should be 
abandoned and resources focused on new growth industries, such as 
electronics, biogenetics, robotics and business services. A frequent 
corollary is that small business is the largest source of net new job 
creation. Strategies fashioned with these premises concentrate on 
venture capital for entrepreneurs, small business technical 
assistance, improvement of infrastructure for business services, and 
increased cross-fertilization between university research efforts and 
private firms. Two outstanding examples of this type of strategy are 
the Allegheny Conference on Conununity Development's 1984 study and the 
Commercial Club of Chicago's study of the same year. 
A Strategy for Growth: An Economic Development Program for the 
Pittsburgh Region 
The Report of the Allegheny Conference on Community Development, 
a CEO organization, takes this route. In listing the basic premises 
of its approach to a regional strategy, the Conference begins with 
First: The strategy should recognize the inevita-
bility of change. The forces that have been at 
work are irreversible. Never again will 
Pi t tsburgh and its surrounding communities be a 
region that depends .so strongly on primary metals 
and other durable goods manufacturing. Nor would 
a return to this state be desirable. While 
durable goods manufacturing remains a key part of 
our economy, concentration on a single type of 
industry can prove to be a great vulnerability . 
(Volume I: 8) 
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In addition to the troubles besetting the steel industry nationally, 
the study cites the westward movement of the market for steel and the 
extraordinary concentration of steel in the region as causes for 
pessimism. 
The Conferences's reticence to advocate steel and related heavy 
industry is reflected in the short shrift these industries merit in 
the sununary volume: 
Our expertise in metals has diminished but need 
not fade entirely. Efforts should go forward to 
maintain what we can of the traditional primary 
metals base and its support industries. (Volume 
I: 25) 
This reluctance is particularly interesting in light of the fact that 
one of the Conference's nine Task Forces focused on manufacturing and 
strongly recommended a Manufacturing Retention and Expansion Program, 
jointly between the city and county, which would establish a financing 
assistance clearinghouse, assist with wit~ preparation and infra-
structure, increase federal procurement, establish a supplier match-up 
program, and build a network of business consulting services for 
existing companies (Volume II:ll-13). None of these ideas made the 
final report. The Conference's strategy clearly espouses funneling 
resources toward international headquarters, finance, regional 
services and high tech functions in lieu of basic manufacturing. 
Make No Little Plans: Jobs for Metropolitan Chicago. 
The Commercial Club of Chicago's study, released in December 
1984, skirts the industrial issue in Chicago by more or less ignoring 
it (Commercial Club, 1984c). Five primary objectives are identified 
by the Steering Committee (p.8): 
-41-
a. 
b. 
c. 
Stimulate new enterprises and assist existing 
small businesses; 
Improve the business climate by correcting such weak-
nesses as the high cost of doing business; 
Market the advantages the area has to attract and 
retain business; 
d . Improve the net flow of federal funds; 
e. Build on metropolitan Chicago's strengths in such 
areas as financial services, transportation, communica-
tions and health care. 
To the extent that targetting is recommended, the Commercial Club 
study stresses promoting Chicago as a leading center for financial 
services, retaining and attracting banking and insurance industry 
processing centers, developing Chicago as· a health care center, 
stimulating international business (especially in banking and regional 
headquarters), and software development (pp. 28-32). Nowhere is steel 
or other heavy industry, so critical to the South Side, explicitly 
mentioned. 
2.2. Bidding Down 
Another prominent view is that the midwestern economy. must 
revitalize its basic heavy industrial sectors, whose crisis lies in 
their uncompetitive cost structure. This position stresses the cost 
differentials, across U.S. regions and among nations in international 
trade, of labor, capital, energy, materials, land, taxes, and environ-
mental regulation. At the national level, this strategy has been most 
recently articulated by the Heritage Foundation's Richard McKenzie, in 
his "Blueprint for Jobs and Industrial Growth," where he espouses 
loosening business regulations, weakening antitrust law, eliminating 
labor rights and benefits, abolishing a number of business taxes and 
elimination of many environmental protections. Two midwestern studies 
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echo this cost-conscious strategy. 
Cleveland Tomorrow -- A Strategy for Economic Vitality 
The Cleveland Tomorrow program, the product of a committee of 
CEOs from 44 major Cleveland corporations, includes a commitment to 
2 basic manufacturing in its three-pronged strategy. But its remedy 
for manufacturing decline focuses singularly on wages and work rules: 
The major cause of this job loss is high unit 
labor · costs caused by a combination of a long 
history of adversarial labor management relations, 
relatively high wages and restrictive work prac-
tices. Given these high costs, Cleveland facili-
ties bore the brunt of the changes in manufactur-
ing worldwide. (Shatten, 1985:1). 
As a .result of this viewf the recommendations for "anchor" industries 
target labor-management relations almost exclusiyely. The report 
argues that "labor and management are limited in their motivation and 
freedom to undertake a local initiative to reduce the high unit labor 
costs driving much of this loss" (Cleveland Tomorrow:ll). It 
recommends an Industrial Competitiveness Project aimed at this 
problem. Beyond that, the only other aid suggested for anchor 
industries is a productivity center (pp.12-14). All other initiatives 
research, entrepreneurial services, the Cleveland Seed Capital Fund 
are set aside for growth industries (p. 15-18). 
Economic Plan: Jobs for Metropolitan Chicago 
In an earlier version of the Co~ercial Club Report, published in 
March of 1984, a great deal more is said about basic manufacturing. 
This earlier report contains summaries of seventeen resource committee 
efforts, one of which was devoted to manufacturing. This report notes 
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that manufacturing still provides 24% of all Chicago's nonagricultural 
jobs and that its industrial base is more diversified than other 
midwestern cities (Commercial Club; 1984a:63). This status report 
underlines "key weaknesses" and "threats" to include local labor 
rates, local taxes, and unsupportive political environment, and 
perceived low labor productivity . It recommends six areas for further 
investigation (p·. 65) : 
a. Promote "downstream" petrochemical production; 
b. Create a "factory of the future" -- joint private-
public efforts; 
c. Examine the possibility of forming a management/union 
partnership to address key issues; 
d. Develop programs which promote the use of industrial 
development bonds, municipal bonds and other financial 
incentives; 
e. 
f . 
Develop and maintain an attractive climate for business 
professionals, especially the top business leaders; 
Explore possible changes in the state's workmen's 
compensation and unemployment compensation laws. 
What is noteworthy here is · that only the last two items were deemed 
important enough for inclusion in the final report, which devotes a 
surprisingly long section (pp. 24-5) to the two issues of workmen's 
compensation and unemployment insurance, as the essence of the need to 
"trim the high costs of doing business." 
2.3. Betting on the Basics 
Several studies have chosen the controversial route of selecting 
certain key industrial sectors as the recipients of special research, 
investment and other public sector incentives. These studies reject 
the "sunrise" industry route because they do not believe that their 
economies will be successful candidates for these types of activity or 
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that the jobs created will be sufficient and of the appropriate sort 
to solve the unemployment problem. Secondly, they differ from the 
previous set of studies mentioned in that they do not believe that the 
major problems of these industries lie in their cost structure, but 
rather in their unique histories, their industrial structure, their 
product and process designs, and their current fate under national 
macroeconomic policy directives. The solution lies in enhancing the 
comparative advantages of particular facilities, product lines and 
subsectors in the existing heavy industrial complex, through 
pioneering new public sector economic development tools. 
Choosing a Future: Steps to Revitalize the MidAmerican Economy over 
the Next Decade. 
The only comprehensive study done of the midwestern economy in 
1984, this SRI International study prepared for the Ameritrust Corpo-
ration, takes · the bold position that the revitalization of basic 
manufacturing is essential for midwest.ern recovery. 
The industries reviewed emphasize existing manu-
facturing because neither norunanufacturing nor new 
manufacturing industries have significant poten-
tial to serve as a base for a MidAmerican recovery 
within this century. A MidAmerican recovery is 
impossible without a manufacturing 
recovery •••• Most of the Midwest's resurgence, 
therefore, must be based on recapturing a 
competitive position in its existing industries. 
(SRI International, 1984:38). 
The report stresses that effective action must be tailored to the 
needs of individual industries, and that major steps need to be taken 
in the following areas (p.2): 
technology utilization 
management practices 
labor-management relations 
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education and training 
capital investment 
!ts key conclusion is 
••• that MidAmerica can to a large degree take 
charge of its own destiny: it can choose a future. 
The easy -- and regrettable _...; choice would be 
simply to continue with business as usual, assum-
ing . naively that the current economic upturn 
signals the end of the region's deep-seated 
economic problems • The more challenging -- and 
necessary -- choice would be to take major steps 
to restore MidAmerican competitiveness and revi-
talize key industries" (p.159). 
The Cleveland Metropolitan Economy Study 
In 1982, the Rand Corporation completed a study of the Cleveland 
area economy for the Cleveland Foundation. Their findings anticipated 
The Ameritrust analysis of . the larger midwestern economy. They found 
that Cleveland's specialty within the durable manufacturing sectors 
lay in production of semi-finished metal goods, machine tools, 
electrical industrial equipment, and instruments. 
Efforts to expand the export activities of some of 
the service sectors may pay off, but it is 
unlikely that these industries will sell enough 
outside the metropolitan area to replace 
manufacturing as the core of the Cleveland area's 
economic base. So, in a sense , the region is 
still wedded to its traditional strengths. 
Additiona threats to this strength should be 
viewed very seriously.. • (Gurwitz and Kingsley, 
1982 :xvii). 
They recommended ongoing monitoring of Cleveland's economic base and 
more detailed analysres of problems and opportunities in specific, key 
industries such as machine taos and metal stampings . 
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The Path to Prosperity: A Long-Term Economic Strateqy for Michigan. 
In late 1984, a panel of Michigan economists issued this report 
for the Governor's Task Force for a Long-Term Economic Strategy. They 
concluded that: 
The central focus of any state economic develop-
ment policy must be the expansion of the state's 
economic base (Task Force, 1984:9). 
They found that farming and tourism account for few jobs, and that 
business services, the only other major element in the economic base, 
are located in the state primarily because there are manufacturing 
firms there to purchase their services. 
Manufacturing industries, therefore, remain the 
real strength of Michigan's industrial engine. If 
we want to understand how that engine has per-
formed, manufacturing must be our focus. (p.10) 
The Michigan economists reject the "get out" strategy, as they dub it, 
demonstrating that high tech jobs are not a feasible nor desirable 
alternative to basic durable goods manufacturing. 
They also reject what they call the "get poor" strategy of 
lowering wages to meet those paid to production workers in Oklahoma, 
Mississippi, Mexico and Taiwan. Pointing out that this would force a 
substantial cut in the standard of living of the state's industrial 
workers, they regard as "an unwelcome last resort any economic 
strategy that promises our children a future less prosperous than 
their parents' past" (p. 46). They also reject reductions of 
publicly-controlled business costs such as worker's compensation and 
unemployment insurance, pointing out that Minnesota has the highest 
such state and local costs in the region and has the most impressive 
manufacturing growth rate in spite of them. 
The Michigan "Get Smart" strategy counsels that the state must 
shift from mass-produced, low-wage production toward complex, skill-
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intensive manufacturing which cannot easily be transferred elsewhere. 
These complex manufacturing processes are 
••• more automated, more precise, more flexible, 
more integrated and more customized ••• (p.51) 
and must be mounted in the "factory of the future." (pp. 52-55) . The 
public sector's role includes the engendering of new technologies, new 
skills, new labor-ma.nagement relations and new managerial styles. 
The Michigan study is in some ways an inheritor of ideas first 
put forth in a 1981 program called F.ational Reindustrialization, an 
agenda for the recovery of the Detroit economy proposed by Dan Luria 
and Jack Russell (1984). They argue that Detroit's expertise lies in 
metal bending industries, and that new product lines need to be found 
to absorb auto displacement. They earmark energy hardware as a major 
direction: deep gas and heavy oil equipment, cogenerators and indus-
trial process engines, and minemouth gasiiers. The program also 
advocates capital targetting, the use of eminent domain, tax increment 
financing, pension fund capital and employee ownership. 
2.4. Specific Regional and Local Programs for Steel 
Among the industries most carefully scrutinized by rnidwestern 
policy makers is steel. At least two major studies examined the 
possibilities for a revitalized steel industry, one in Pittsburgh and 
one jointly between Illinois and Indiana. Both espouse relatively 
bold steps for rest ruct uring the steel industry within their respec-
tive 
regions . 
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Steel Valley Authority: A Community Plan to Save Pittsburgh's 
Steel Industry. 
In 1984, the Tri-State Conference on Steel, a non~profit 
community action organization of workers, the unemployed, local union 
leaders, clergy and community activists, issued a full scale plan to 
revive the steel complex in the Pittsburgh area (Tri-State Conference, 
1984; Stout, 1983). Noting that steel is the backbone of an 
industrial society and the main source of income for the mill towns 
lining the banks of the Monogahela Valley, they argue that there is no 
other choice than steel, since services and high tech will not meet 
the level or target populations experiencing displacement: 
Industrial reconstruction must conform to the 
human and infrastructure resources available. It 
is senseless to break up our developed industrial 
centers and scatter the skilled. labor to the four 
corners of the land in search of economic survival 
(Tri-State Conference, 1984:5). 
They propose a Steel Valley Authority, modelled on TVA, which 
could use the power of eminent domain to condemn and purchase unused 
industrial property and refurbish it for resale or public sector 
operation. The market for renewed steel output would be tied to an 
infrastructure rebuilding program and targetted procurement programs 
by federal and state governments. Financing would come from publicly 
underwritten bonds, federal aid, and worker and community shares. 
Organizationally, the new Authority would be responsible to govern-
ments, organized labor, local business and other conununity institu-
tions, and would employ a competent management. 
Since early 1984, this proposal has garnered considerable public 
support. Some eight Mon Valley local governments have voted to set up 
the Authority. The inunediate target of the plan is the Duquesne mill 
of U.S. Steel, which is presently idled. Demolition.has been delayed 
for over a year. A steelworker-funded study found that the mill could 
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be profitably operated to produce semi-finished steel (Locker/Abrecht, 
1985). A Lazard Freres study has found that a market exists for the 
mill's product (Turnazos, 1985). A Wall Street effort to secure 
·financing for a conversion is presently underway. 
Strategy 21: Pittsburgh/Allegheny Economic Development Strategy 
In June of 1985, a joint partnership of chief executives from the 
City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County and the area's two major univer-
sities issued a call for $203 million in-state funding for a set of 
projects to revive the Pittsburgh economy. The call was clearly a 
response to both the two studies cited above -- the Tri-State plea for 
a commitment to steel and the Allegheny Conference's advocacy of high 
tech arid corporate headquarters. The Strategy 21, referring to the 
21st Century, proposed major commitments to a new airport, to two new 
basic research centers (biotechnology and robotics) , and to a compre-
hensive study of the metals-producing sectors. Its four goals 
straddle the basics and high tech (City of Pittsburgh, et al, 1985): 
1. Reinforce region's traditional economic base 
as center for metals industry and corporate 
headquarters 
2. Convert underutilized land, facilities and 
labor force components to new uses, especially 
those involved in advanced technology 
3. Enhance region's quality of life, thereby 
attracting new residents and increasing 
tourism 
4. Expand opportunities for women, minorities and 
structurally unemployed 
Unlike the Tri-State's action-oriented plan for steel revitaliza-
tion, Strategy 21 is more cautious about its metals industry 
proposals. It proposes a major ($750,000) study of these industries 
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-- the existing facilities, their condition and market prospects, and 
possible re-use of nonviable mills: 
Initially the study would analyze which metals 
facilities have the best potential for becoming 
competitive in the international market and which 
facilities have no long-term viability. It would 
then recommend a joint strategy to provide needed 
support to those with the greatest potential cmd 
to assist in the conversion to new uses of those 
facilities which are no longer viable (p. 3A). 
An example of the latter is the Strategy's proposal to convert the 
old J & L mill into a major high tech research laboratory . 
Public Policy and $teel: The Bi-State Perspective· 
A somewhat older study, and perhaps all the more remarkable for 
its farsightedness, is the 1980 Illinois-Indiana Bi-State Commission 
report. It concludes that 
The outlook for this basic industry cannot improve 
without massive restructuring and a shift in 
attitudes on the part of industry management, 
labor, and government •••• A regional understanding 
of the dynamics of this trend within the industry 
appears called for, as is a mutual approach for 
developing public policies and programs which 
complement, rather than compete, with each other. 
(Illinois-Indiana Bi-State Commission, 1980:1) 
The study summarizes the experience of the industry both nationally 
and regionally, surveying past initiatives by Chicago and other 
governments. It ends by calling for an Interstate Task Force on 
Public Policy and Steel, to be created by the Governors of both 
states, a call which has yet to be heeded. 
The report raises some provocative questions about steel which 
are often skirted in other policy analyses. These include the follow-
ing: 
0 Do current strategies assume that the steel 
industry will maintain its traditional level of 
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importance in the region or a weakening of that 
presence? Is this an accurate appraisal? 
Is the region actively pursuing those steel 
sectors which are growing (specialty/alloy and 
non-integrated producers)? 
How will technology influence the growth of 
steel suppliers in the region? 
Is the region capturing the full potential 
benefits of steel's presence? 
What mechanisms are currently available to deal 
with the immediate needs of the displaced 
employees when a mill is closed temporarily or 
permanently? What is the legal responsibility 
of employers who intend to close mills? 
What are the potential uses for abandoned steel 
facilities? 
What short and long~term assistance is 
available to local communities when a facility 
shuts down on a permanent basis? 
In addition, the report raises a series of challenging questions about 
manpower and employment policies, taxing policies, environmental 
policies, transportation plans, and energy and raw materials policy. 
2.5. Where the Differences Lie 
The strategies reviewed, which represent a formidable response, 
at least in study form, to the crisis of midwestern industry, differ 
from one another so profoundly because they accept widely divergent 
underlying assumptions about what the nature of the problem is. The 
"Bowing Out" strategy assumes that post-industrial society is upon us 
and that the demise of manufacturing is a fait accompli. Critics of 
this approach argue that the current recessionary record is not a good 
measure of basic industry potential, that macroeconomic policy choices 
have seriously prejudiced resource allocation against basic industry, 
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and that manufacturing overall remains a constant share of GNP and 
has not declined in numbers of jobs. They also believe that there are 
no good alternatives. 
The "Bidding Down" strategy assumes that high costs of doing 
business especially labor and public sector costs, are the major 
deterrent to midwesternmanufacturing revival. The critics of this 
view argue that the evidence is not clear, and that historial choices, 
industrial structure and management styles that affect technological 
innovati veness and productivity have as much to do with current 
predicaments as do cost factors. Furthermore, they tend to view the 
erosion of wages, related small business failures, and public sector 
revenues as an unacceptable price for industrial revitalization. 
The "Betting on the Basics" strategy assumes that a dramatic 
commitment to targetted sectors and facilities is possible both 
financially and institutionally, and will work. Critics of these 
assumptions argue that the private sector would be doing it if this 
were so, and the cost in terms of resources is too high. In response, 
advocates of industrial targetting argue that a one-time infusion is 
required in the present crisis to avert permanent shutdown of useable 
midwestern facilities and that such interventions have worked in the I 
past (the New Deal, TVA, Conrail, Lockheed, Chrysler, war time produc- I
i 
1 
tion). They stress the opportunities for new products, market niches, 
new business structures, and improved technology. 
To some extent, differences in political support for each 
strategy arise from the differential distribution of benefits from 
each. Workers and Mon Valley communities in the Pittsburgh area, for 
instance, believe that their needs won't be met by the Allegheny 
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Conference's preference for financial and business headquarters, while 
presumably banker and corporate executives in the latter group are not 
keen to see scarce resources directed toward reviving steel 
production. Industrialists are more apt to favor the "Bidding Down" 
strategy while financial and real estate groups are more apt to favor 
"Bowing Out" and going for high tech and services. 
. The major policy tools embraced by each strategy also differ. 
The "Bidding Down" and "Betting on the Basics" strategies favor 
targetting incentives and intervention toward heavy industry, while 
the "Bowing Out" strategy would target them toward newer sectors. In 
general the "Betting on the Basics" s_trategy would more narrowly 
funnel resources while the other two would prefer incentives, like 
small business assistance and tax breaks, that are generally available 
to all comers. 
A second difference is the degree to which each strategy 
advocates the necessity for new sources of capital investment. "The 
Betting on the Basics Strategy" is the most insistent that new capital 
infusions are needed, directed toward selected mature sectors. The 
"Bowing Out" strategy favors it for new entrepreneurial efforts in the 
high tech and service sectors. The "Bidding Down" strategy omits 
emphasis on new investment, assuming that successful down pricing of 
regional resources will attract private sector capital. 
2.6. Directions for Southeast Chicago 
With the exception of the Commercial Club's work cited above, no 
major economic development strategies for Chicago have been designed. 
A number of excellent speeches, press articles and op ed pieces have 
been produced on the seriousness of the Chicago economy's long-term 
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problems (see for example, Longworth, 1981 and 1984; Lemonidas, 1984; 
Bennett, 1984; Klarich, 1984, and Rosenheim, 1985). overall, they 
confirm a picture of industrial difficulties and insufficient compen-
satory growth in other sectors. The slowness of Chicago reacting with 
concrete and far-reaching solutions may be simply because this situa-
tion is so novel for the city. Long a major diversified production, 
distribution and service center, whose economy generally weathered the 
business cycle considerably better than Pittsburgh, Detroit, or Los 
Angeles, Chicago has always been cosmopolitan in its outlook and 
unself-conscious about the uniqueness of its · own economy. 
The research findings presented in the following chapters suggest 
that Chicago should concentrate on the third strategy and maintain its 
steel-based industrial complex, for three reasons. One, that complex, 
unlike Pittsburgh or Youngstown's is relatively youthful and has been 
gaining share nationally both in the postwar period and in recent \ 
years (Chapter 3). Chicago retains outstanding locational advantages 
(Chapters 1, 3, 7). 
Second, the major problems of the steel-based complex are not 
natural or inevitable. They are the product of ill-conceived macro-
economic and international policies, coupled with a legacy of poor 
management and bad investment choices (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8). Wage \ 
and energy costs are a relative disadvantage, but do not pose an 
insurmountable competitive problem (Ch. 8). Despite a less than 
auspicious recent past, the steel industry is far from finished (Ch. 
4, 8). New products and processes could turn the job loss record 
around (Ch. 7) . 
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Third, the Chicago area has no good alternative. Its service 
sector is growing more slowly than elsewhere precisely because it is 
·linked to basic industrial sectors (Chapter 1). High tech industries, 
which have been rather prominent here traditionally, are rapidly 
loosing ground and the newer. Fast-growing high tech sectors are 
disproportionately concentrated in heavy defense spending regions, 
especially the aerospace complexes of Southern California and Florida. 
Nor will big defense hardware purchases generate much demand for steel 
(Ch. 3 1 8). 
By emphasizing existing strengths, Chicago would be countering 
the general midwestern tide toward abandoning basic industry. 
However, this can not be done by standing still. Success in a 
"betting on the basics" strategy will require a commitment of energy 
and resources from private industry, the unions, the community, the 
area's universities, state and local government. An industrial 
) renewal program needs concerted research efforts, an infusion of investment, and new cooperative organizational forms . 
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